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This paper  shows  that market  economies  with search  and in  which  wages 
are affected  by efficiency  wage considerations  are not constrained  Pareto 
efficient.  Wages  are not set at Pareto  efficient  levels, nor is the level 
of employment  (unemployment)  Pareto  efficient.  We identify  the nature  of the 
biases  and the welfare  improving  government  interventions. 
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Serious  macro-economists  have  long  been  faced  with  a 
dilemma:  how  can  one  reconcile  the  seeming  inefficiencies 
associated with  the  periodic episodes of  unemployment and under 
utilization  of  capital with  those  rational, competitive  forces 
which,  in  our  traditional micro-economic paradigm, at  least,  we 
argue  ruthlessly seek out  profitable opportunities, eliminating 
waste  and weed  out  incompetent producers.  In  their quest for  a 
resolution to  this  dilemma,  economists have  identified a  number 
of ways  in which our economy differs from  the  idealization of the 
Arrow-Debreu  model,  ways  which  can  explain  the  existence  and 
persistence of  unemployment, among  the  most  important of  which 
are  the  presence  of  search  costs  and  the  dependence  of 
productivity on  wages  (the  efficiency wage hypothesis.)  Once we 
recognize  the  importance  of  these,  then  the  existence  of 
unemployment  need  not  be  evidence  of  market  inefficiency: 
economic efficiency requires the  movement of  labor from one  job 
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I to  another,  as  disturbances change  the  marginal productivity of 
workers in different  industries;  search takes  time  and  resources; 
even  if  it  were  always  feasible  always  to  move  labor 
instantaneously from  its  low  productivity use,  with  no  interim 
period of  unemployment,  it  may--for some  individuals,  under  some 
circumstances--be inefficient to  devote the  resources to  search 
required for  such  transitions;  it may be  more  efficient to spend 
a  period unemployed.  Indeed,  the very words we use to  describe 
the resulting  unemployment  rate,  "the natural rate"  suggests that 
there  is nothing particular perverse,  or  inefficient,  about  this 
unemployment. 
By  the  same  token,  if  productivity  is  increased  by 
increasing wages,  it  is  quite  plausible that  efficiency entails 
wages at above  market clearing levels. 
More  broadly,  the  approach  taken  by  modern  macro- 
economists,  in which  the  terms  of  the contracts between workers 
and  employers cakes  into  account not  only  the absence of  income 
insurance  for  workers,  but  also  search/mobility  costs  and 
efficiency  wage considerations,  seems  to preclude the possibility 
that  any  resulting  unemployment  is  inefficient:  for  the 
contracts are  designed to  be  "locally efficient,"  that  is,  to 
maximize the firms'  profits, given  the reservetion utility levels 
of workers. 
the  lime  of  reasoming  that  we  have  presented  in  the 
preceding paragraph,  as  persuasive as  it  may  seem,  is  simply 
wrong.  the  fundamental question in which we  are  interested is, 
2 is  a decentralized market  economy--characterized  by  aearch  costa, 
efficiency wages,  incomplete insurance  markets, by  a  variety of 
other  informational imperfections,  or  by  other deviations  from 
the  standard  specification  of  the  competitive  model  which 
seemingly  enhance  its  realism--is  such  an  economy  Pareto 
efficient?  In  judging  the  efficiency of  the  resulting market 
allocations,  we need to take explicitly into  account the  coats  of 
search  or  information acquisition;  of  the  factors  which  make 
productivity  dependent on wages;  of the absence of  a complete set 
of  insurance  markets.  We  ask,  are  there  feasible government 
interventions,  which respect to  these  aspects  of  actual market 
economies,  which  can  make  everyone better  off.  (We  do not  ask,. 
is  it  reasonable  to  assume  that  governments  which  actually 
intervene  do so  in such  a way  as to effect  a pareto improvement?) 
In  deference  to  common  usage,  when  there  exist  such 
interventions,  we  say  chat  the  economy  is  constrained pareto 
inefficient;  in  adopting this  language,  we  emphasize that  we  do 
not  believe that  the  considerations  under  examination  here,  such 
as  information costs,  are any less  "real"  than production costs. 
We  show  here  that  (for  rather  different reasons)  market 
economies with search and  efficiency wages  are,  in general,  not 
constrained Pareto  efficient.  In  earlier  work  (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz,  1986),  we  proved a  general theorem establishing that 
markets with  imperfect information  and  incomplete markets were 
constrained Pareto inefficient.  An  explicit assumption of  that analysis,  however,  was  that  markets  cleared,  whereas  here we  are 
concerned  with  situations  where  markets  may  not.  Though 
efficiency may  indeed  entail  the presence of  some  unemployment, 
with  wages  set  above  market  clearing  levels,  there  is  a 
presumption that  neither the  level  of  unemployment or  wages  is 
Pareto efficient.2 
Efficiency  Wage Models 
The  basic hypothesis of  the  efficiency wage  model  is  that 
workers'  productivity  depends  on  the  wage  paid;  here  we 
generalize the standard formulation  by allowing productivity (per 
hour)  to depend also  on  the  number  of hours worked.  Assume that 
there are  L identical workers,  we assume.  The  ith firm's output 
is simply a function of its effective  labor supply,  L1h1r1(v1,h1) 
where  v1  is the  wage  its workers receive (which  may  differ  from 
the  wage  the  firm  pays,  w1,  because of  taxes)  and  h1  is  the 
number of hours each  of its  L1 workers  works: 
2  Other  studies  have  called  attention  to  the  Pareto 
inefficiency  of  implicit  contract  equilibria  (Newbery  and 
stiglitz,  1987),  of  search  equilibria ((Hosios  (1984),  Mortenson 
(1982),  Pissarides (1984),  Arnott and  Stiglitz (1985),  Stiglitz 
(1985)),  and  of  implicit contracts  which are explicitly designed 
to  take  into  account  the  search  which  they  induce  (Arnott, 
Hosios,  Stiglitz,  1980).  The  objective of  this  paper  is  to 
formulate a  more  general model  than those previously employed,  which can embrace both efficiency  wage and search considerations; 
this  general formulation is,  in fact,  a  simple extension of  our 
general  approach to  the  analysis  of  the  efficiency of economies 
with incomplete markets and imperfect information (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz,  1986).  This  general approach  has the-further advantage  of  being able to  identify  potential pareto improving government 
interventions. 
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The  firm  maximizes its profits,  —piQi 
-  wihLi,  subject to  che 
constraint that  it  must  offer  a  contract that  exceeds workers' 
reservation  utility: 
U(wi,hi;  )  U  (2) 
where  utility  is  a  function of wages  and  hours,  as  well  as  the 
consumer price  vector,  q.  It  is  by  now  well  known  that  the 
solution may  entail  the  constraint (2)  not  being binding.  We 
focus  on  this  regime here.  The  maximized level of profits will 
be  a  function of  prices  and  the relationship between wages  paid 
and  wages  received;  with  an ad valorem wage tax,  v—w(l-r)  ,  and 
we  write  icj*ir*j(pjr)  ,  with  the  standard  result  that  the 
derivative  of  profits  with  respect  to  price  is  equal  to  the 
firm's  output.3  (Because wages  are  set  by  the  firm,  they  do not 
appear explicitly in the profit function.) 
The  fact  that  wages  may  exceed  market clearing levels  in 
equilibrium implies  that  we  will  need  to  divide consumers into 
two  gtoups,  the  employed and  the  unemployed.  Given consumer 
prices,  q  ,  the  level  of  income  (in  excess  of  wage  income,  if 
any)  required by an  individual to attain  a  level  of  utility  13* 
is given  by the modified expenditure  functions: 
gju — Ei(p,O,0,U*)  for  an unemployed  household 
and 
With the  caveat that  if productivity depends  on consumer 
prices,  then  there  is an additional term reflecting the effect of 
the change in producer prices on consumer prices,  and  the effect 
of that  on productivity, at any  given  level  of wages  and hours. 
5 Eje  —  EJ(p,h,v,U*)  for  an  employed houaehold working  h 
hours  and receiving  a wage  of  vj  per  hour. 
The  jth  household owns  a  fraction au  of  the  ith  firm.  If 
the government imposes  a set  of taxes  which changes  p  ,  q  ,  h 
or  v  ,  then  for  the  jth household to  attain utility  level  IJ* 
requires a compensatory  payment of  AEJ  -  Eaijtri* 
,  where 
is  the  change  in  the  ith  firm's  profits.  We  denote these 
compensations  by i.] 
Assume the  government imposes  a  set  of  commodity taxes,  so 
the  kth  consumer price  is now  q  —  Pk  + tk;  an ad valorem wage 
tax  at  the  rate  r  and a -tax  per employed worker at the  rate  p 
The  profit  •function  can  be modified in a  straightforward way  to 
reflect the per-employee tax, to read  r1.*_1r*i (p,p,r).  Mow,  if 
the  government can impose  a  set  of  taxes  which  raises  revenue, 
after  paying all  individuals  compensation which allows them to 
remain at  the  same  level  of  utility they had  attained in  the 
market equilibrium,  raises  revenue,  then the  market equilibrium 
cannot  have  been  (constrained)  pareto  efficient.  Government 
revenue is 
R — EtiQi  + rZwi  hi + pL 
-  sii  (3) 
where  L is aggregate employment,  Qk  is aggregate consumption  of 
the  kth  commodity, and where prices  are determined at the market 
clearing  levels  (with  firms  choosing  their  profit  maximizing 
levels  of  inputs  and  outputs,  and  households  choosing  their 
utility maximizing consumption bundles,  constrained,  of  course, 
6 by  the availability of jobs).  Wages and hours are  set  at profit 
maximizing levels.  For  the remainder of the paper,  we assume the 
profit maximizing value  of  h  is  unaffected by  taxes,  and  focus 
on wages. 
Straightforward differentiation,  making use  of  the  standard 
properties of  expenditure  and profit functions,  establishes that 
at t 
—  o,4  ,  — a  , 
—  a 
dR/dt  — gju 
- je)d/ -  (dje/dw)jw/dt)  (4) 
ju  -  je  is the amount an unemployed  worker would be willing to 
pay  to obtain a  job.  Similar expressions  hold for changes in  r 
and  p  We  decompose the  total  effects  of  the  tax  into  four 
elements 
(i)  A direct  effect  in  raising consumer prices and  government 
revenue.  These  are  simply  transfer  effects--when the government 
compensates  the  individual  for  the  increased prices,  the  two 
effects (for  small  taxes)  cancel. 
(ii)  A  general  equilibrium effect on  prices;  an  increase in 
prices raises  profits,  and  lowers  consumers'  utility;  again this 
is  a  transfer effect,  and  so  long  as  the  goods'  market clears 
these  effects cancel  (recalling that every  firm must  be  owned by 
This  expression holds if all  firms  are  identical  and all 
individuals (cx  ante)  are  well.  More  generally we  write,  for 
small  taxes 
AR = Z&J  (AK)  -  (dEie/dV)  A wj] 
where  —  1  for  a  worker who  was  unemployed before  the 
imposition  of the  tax  and  is employed  after; 
-  1  for  a worker who 
was  employed before  the  tax  and  is  unemployed  after;  and  0 
otherwise. 
7 someone,  i.e.  Ea 
—  1).  (If productivity depends on consumer 
prices,  then  there is  an  additional,  non-transfer, effect,  from 
sny change in consumer  prices, equsl  to  Ep  F'Lhrq 
•  (dq/dt). 
(iii)  An  indirect effect  on  the  profit  maximizing  level  of 
employment;  by  the  envelope theorem,  the  effect on  profits  is 
zero,  but  the effect on consumers--since  there  is job  rationing-- 
is  positive;  the  dollar  value  of  this  is equal  to  the difference 
between the compensation,  net of wages  received,  required for  the 
unemployed to  be  at  the  seme  level of utility as  the  employed. 
Because  private  firma  ignore  this  term,  market  equilibrium 
entails too little employment. 
(iv)  An  indirect effect  on  the  wage  level.  Again,  by  the 
envelope theorem, the  effect on profits is  zero,  but the  effect 
on  consumers is positive (if wages increase).  Thus,  there is  a 
presumption that  market wages  are  too  low,  even  though they  are 
set at above market clearing levels. 
Notice that  this  formulation  not only establishes that  there 
are welfare enhancing government  interventions,  but also tells us 
precisely what kinds of interventions are  desirable:  those that 
increase- employment and wages.  Thus,  a  small  ad valorem wage 
subsidy,  which,  at  least  in  the  simplest  versions  of  the 
efficiency wage model,  will leave  consumer wages  unchanged, will 
increase  employment  and  hence  increase  welfare.  Assume 
productivity  is  positively  effected  by  food  consumption  and 
negatively affected by  alcohol consumption,  in  such  a  way  that 
the  firm  responds  to  a  food  subsidy  and  an  alcohol  tax  by 
8 increasing employment,  but  leaving  wsges  unchsnged or  increased; 
in  these  circumstances a  food  subsidy  and  an  alcohol tax  may  be 
desirable. 
Search 
It  has  long  been  recognized that  search  can  give  rise  to 
unemployment,  particularly if  (at  least  for  some  individuals) 
off-the-job  search  is  more  efficient  that  on-the-job  search. 
Although some  search  unemployment  will  then  clearly characterize 
market equilibrium,  it is again  by no means  clear that  the  level 
of  unemployment will  be  Pareto  efficient.  We  show  that  it  is 
not,  using a  framework  similar to that  employed in our diacussion 
of  efficiency  wages.  Again,  there  will  be  employed  and 
unemployed  workera,  now depending  upon which workers successfully 
obtain jobs.  Firms'  deciaions concerning hiring, lay-offs, and 
search  and  workers'  decisions  concerning  quits  and  search 
intensities  all  generate "search"  externalities,  affecting  the 
likelihood of  a  firm  finding a well-matched worker and a worker 
finding a well-matched  job. 
To  see  the parallel with  the  earlier  section as  clearly as 
possible, we  focus  on  a  special case where all individuals and 
firms  are  (cx  ante)  identical,  and  where,  in  equilibrium,  all 
firms  pay  the  same  wage.  The probability  of a match is  I(x,y) 
where  x  is the vector of workers'  search intensities (here,  for 
simplicity,  assumed to  be  dollars spent  on  search),  and  y  is 
9 the  vectot  of  firms'  "hiring"  intensities.  Employment,  L  ,  is 
just  equal to  N'  ,  whera  N  is the number of potential  workers. 
For  simplitity,  we  partition the vector  x —  (xj;x*)  where  x* 
is  the  search intensity of all  other  workers.  Firm  i  chooses 
wages  and hiring intensities  to maximize expected profits (taking 
into account the  effect  of those  decisions  on  the likelihood  of a 
match);  and  its maximized value  of profits can be represented by 
lr*i(p;  r  ,  p  ;  z)  ,  where  z1  is  a description of the relevant 
market environment,  here,  the wages  and hiring intensities  of all 
other  firms  and  the  search  intensities  of all  individuals  (which 
are,  of  course,  endogenous).  As  before  we  can  write  the 
expenditure  function of  those  who  are  successful in obtaining a 
job  and  those  who  are  not  by  gie  and  gju  ,  respectively, 
noting now  the  dependence on  the market environment,  zj  which 
now  includes the  search  intensities  of  others  as  well  as  all 
firms'  hiring  intensities  and  wage  levels.  These  variables 
together  determine the individual's  expenditures on search. 
An  identical argument to  that  employed before shows  that  if 
the  government  can  impose  taxes  which  raises  revenue,  after 
compensating  individuals,  then  the  market  equilibrium is  not 
constrained  pareto  efficient.  Again,  straightforward 
differentiation  yields 
dR/dt  AE  [dL/dt  Nx(dx/dt)] 
-  L(dgje,/dwdw/d)  + 
E(Dir4x/äz*)(dz*/dt)  (5) 
where the  subscript  z  denotes a  derivative with respect to  z 
and where  AE — gju  -  gje 
10 The  first  term  is  slightly modified from  its  earlier form, 
to  reflect the  fact  thst  the  individual,  deciding on her  sesrch 
intensity,  tskes  into  sccount  the  expected gain  in utility from 
the  increased likelihood of  employment from  additional  search; 
the  individual does  not  take  into  account  the  effect  of  those 
search  decisions on the employment  prospects of others,  and firms 
do  not  take  into  account  the  gain  in  utility  of  those  who  do 
obtain  jobs  as  a  result  of  their  increased  recruitment 
activities. 
There  are  two  additional terms  besides  those  discussed in 
the  previous  section,  arising  from  the  "external" effects  on 
profits:  An increase in hiring intensity  by one firm reduces  the 
likelihood of  a  match by  another  firm  and hence has a negative 
effect  on  their  profits.  (These  are,  however,  total  general 
ecp.iilibrium  derivatives,  and  the  indirect  effect  of  these 
perturbations  on  workers'  search  intensity,  and  of  that  on 
profits, needs to be taken  into  account.) 
The  market failure we  have  identified here tan be  given a 
"missing markets"  interpretation.  Suppose there  is  a  notional 
employment agency that pays  q,  for search intensity  x  and 
qy 
for  hiring intensity  y  ,  and  in turn  receives payments of  q 
for matches.  The  expected  number of matches is a function of the 
vector  (xj,yi} 
.  Then  the employment  agency maximizes 
q0E $j  (x,y) 
-  x  - 
qy  y 
.  LI  looks  like the  production 
function  of  the  employment  agency.  Since  this  formulation 
eliminates  the  externality,  the  solution  to  this  problem  in 
11 conjunction with  the  maximization  problems  of  households  and 
firms  yields  the  Pareto  optimal  set  of outcomes.  Looking at  the 
resulting  equilibrium  prices  paid  to  the  notional  employment 
agency,  we  obtain  the  optimal  taxes  and  subsidies  that  a 
government would have to  impose  on  search  related activities in 
the  absence  of  such  an  agency.  And  the  degree  to  which  the 
pseudo-production  function  E exhibits decressing,  increasing, 
or  constant returns  to  scale  determines whether  these  payments 
will  leave  a net  surplus  or deficit.5 
A  Gemeralizatiom.  It  is easy  to generalize the results of 
this  model,  for instance to implicit  contract models,  where firma 
sign  contracts with  workers  to  maximize  their  profits,  for  a 
given  (reservation)  expected utility of  workers.  The  contract 
will  specify  firms'  retention (lay-off)  hiring and wage  decisions 
as a function of  the  state  of nature;  expanding the  "z"  variable 
to include  these  as well  as  the equilibrium search intensities  of 
others,  x*  ,  state  contingent profit  and  expenditure functions 
can again be presented as function of the market vector  z  ;  and 
a state  content tax  on some  commodity  i  is desirable if 
dR/dti — (*z  -  dz/dt ' 0 
A tax which discourages  an individual  from  searching (say because 
it  increases  the  opportunity  cost  of  searching)  has  positive 
externalities on other individuals,  since,  at any  fixed  level  of 
It  is  clear  that  if,  upon  each transaction,  any  surplus 
is  divided  among  the  participants,  there  is  no  division rule 
which  will  result  in  a  pareto  efficient  outcome  unless  the 
pseudo-production  function exhibits constant returns to scale. 
12 search  intensities  on  their  part,  it  increases  the  likelihood 
that  they  will find  a  good  (better)  job.  A  tax which encourages 
firms  to  search  more  for  employees  in  any  state  e  (by 
subsidizing new  employees)  or  discourages  lay-offs  has  positive 
externalities on  workers,  since  at  any  fixed  level of  search 
intensities on  the  part  of worker,  the likelihood that  they  find 
a  (better)  match  is  increased,  but  negative externalities on 
other firms  (because  of the  reduced likelihood of  a  match)  .  We 
conjecture,  but  have  not  proved,  that  normally the  first  effect 
dominates the second:  there  is too  little  hiring. 
Notice  that  firms,  in setting  their  lay-off rates,  take  into 
account the  effect  of changes  in the lay-off rate  on the expected 
utility of  its  own  workers,  but not  the  external effect of  the 
search  efforts  of  its  workers  on  the  likelihood  of  others' 
obtaining  employment. 
Such a  tax  may  have  a  second set of effects,  on  the  wages 
offered by  a different  firms;  if firms  change their  wages for  new 
hires,  in  response to  the  changed search intensity,  there  is a 
second order  effect on profits,  which can be ignored,  but  a first 
order effect on workers'  expected utility. 
Comcludimg Remarks 
Im our earlier work,  we  showed that  market equilibrium with 
competitive  firms,  in contexts im which all markets clear,  but in 
which there was imperfect  imformation  or incomplete  markets would 
not,  in general,  be Pareto  efficient. 
13 Here  we  have  extended  those  results  to  incorporate 
equilibria  in  which  firms  are  wage  setters  rather  than  wage 
takers,  where  they  set  their  wage  to take  into  account efficiency 
wage  considerations  (including  the  effect  on  the  cost  of. 
recruiting  workers and  on labor turnover),  and  where  they  may  set 
the  wage  at a  level  where  markets  do not  clear.  We believe that 
this  provides a  more  accurate  characterization  of  labor  markets 
than  is  provided by  the  standard perfect  information,  market 
clearing model. 
It  should  be  clear  that  similar  results  obtain  in  other 
contexts--in  labor,  product,  and  capital  markets--in which wages, 
prices,  and  interest rates  affect  market behavior,  for  instance 
by  conveying information.  Through efficiency may indeed entail 
unemployment,  credit  rationing,  or  prices  exceeding  marginal 
costs  of  production,  there  is no presumption that  the extent of 
rationing,  and  the  level  of wages,  prices,  and  interest  rates  in 
the market equilibrium  are  efficient.  The precise nature of the 
distortions  depends  on the  exact  specification  of  the  model:  in 
the  efficiency wage  model,  there  was  too  little  employment,  as 
firms  failed  to  take  into  account  the  potentially  large 
discrepancy  in utility of the employed and  the  unemployed. 
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